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Introduction 
 
On August 8, 2005, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) 
increased the Section 48 investment 
tax credit (ITC) for commercial 
photovoltaic (PV) systems from 
10% to 30% of the project’s “tax 
credit basis” (i.e., the dollar amount 
to which the ITC applies), and also 
created in Section 25D of the 
Internal Revenue Code a new 30% 
ITC (capped at $2,000) for 
residential solar systems.  Both 
changes went into effect on January 
1, 2006, for an initial period of two 
years, and in late 2006 both credits 
were extended “as is” for an 
additional year (through 2008). 
 
In early 2006, Berkeley Lab 
published an LBNL/CESA case 
study that examined the financial 
impact of EPAct 2005’s solar tax 
credits on PV system owners, in 
light of the $2,000 cap on the 
residential credit, as well as the fact 
that most PV systems in the U.S. 
also receive cash incentives from 
state-, local-, or utility-administered 
PV programs, and that these cash 
incentives may reduce the value of 
federal tax credits in certain 
situations.  That case study was 
subsequently revised in February  
 
 
 
2007 to reflect new Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) guidance. 
 
The findings of that case study,1 
which are briefly recapped in the 
next section, remained relevant up 
until October 2008, when the 
Energy Improvement and Extension 
Act of 2008 extended both solar 
credits for an unprecedented eight 
years, removed the $2,000 cap on 
the residential credit, and eliminated 
restrictions on the use of both 
credits in conjunction with the 
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).2  
These significant changes, which 
apply to systems placed in service 
on or after January 1, 2009, will 
increase the value of the solar 
credits for residential system owners 
in particular, and are likely to spur 
significant growth in residential, 
commercial, and utility-scale PV 
installations in the years ahead. 
 
In light of these substantial changes 
to the solar ITC, this report takes a 
                                                 
1
 “Exploring the Economic Value of EPAct 
2005’s PV Tax Credits” by Mark Bolinger, 
Ryan Wiser, and Edwin Ing: 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMP/cases/LBNL_59928.pdf 
2
 Less-relevant to this case study, the Act 
also removed the prohibition on utility use 
of the Section 48 credit. 
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fresh look at the value of these revised credits, 
focusing specifically on the Section 25D 
residential credit.  After first setting the stage by 
briefly reviewing our previous findings, the 
document proceeds to cover four specific areas in 
which the removal of the $2,000 cap on the 
residential ITC will have significant implications 
for PV program administrators, PV system 
owners, and the PV industry that go beyond the 
obvious market growth potential created by these 
more-lucrative federal incentives.  These four 
areas include: 
1) The financial implications of whether or 
not residential cash rebates are considered 
to be taxable income; 
2) The role of low-interest loan programs and 
other forms of “subsidized energy 
financing” under an uncapped ITC; 
3) The degree to which taxable and non-
taxable rebate levels might be reduced in 
response to the extra value provided by an 
uncapped ITC; and 
4) The impact of an uncapped ITC on third-
party financing and ownership models that 
are just beginning to emerge in the 
residential sector. 
 
The document concludes by highlighting a 
common thread that runs throughout:  the need 
for PV program managers to understand whether 
or not their rebates are considered to be taxable 
income before they can react in an appropriate 
manner to the recent changes in federal solar 
policy and, if financing programs are offered, the 
need to understand whether the IRS considers 
these programs to be “subsidized.”  Finally, we 
note that this paper is based on current law; 
future legislative changes to the ITC could, of 
course, alter the conclusions reached here. 
 
Recap of Previous Findings 
 
In order to fully grasp the implications of the 
recent changes to the residential solar ITC, one 
must first understand the conditions that existed 
prior to the October 2008 ITC extension and 
revision.  To help foster such an understanding, 
this section briefly revisits the 2006 
LBNL/CESA case study, which found (among 
other things) that the value of EPAct 2005’s solar 
credits depends on several obvious factors, 
including: 
• System owner:  Residential systems face the 
$2,000 cap; commercial systems do not. 
• System size:  Only the smallest residential 
systems (i.e., less than 1 kW) are not bound 
by the $2,000 cap; as system size increases, 
the relative value of the capped residential 
credit decreases. 
• Tax status of system owner:  Tax-exempt 
system owners, as well as any business or 
resident paying the alternative minimum tax 
or without a sufficient tax base, may not be 
able to directly benefit from the credits 
(though 3rd-party financing might enable the 
monetization of some of the credits’ value). 
 
In addition, the previous case study found that a 
not-so-obvious, yet critical, factor in determining 
the value of the EPAct 2005 credits is whether or 
not the IRS considers grants or rebates provided 
by state, local, or utility PV programs to be 
taxable income.  This is still true under the recent 
changes to the ITC:  if the grants provided by 
these programs are considered to be federally 
taxable income, then a grant recipient can claim 
the federal ITC (and depreciation if a commercial 
system) on the full cost (or tax credit basis) of the 
system.  If, however, the grants are not 
considered to be taxable income, then the grant 
recipient must reduce, by the amount of the grant, 
the basis to which the federal ITC (and 
depreciation, in the case of commercial systems) 
applies. 
 
The IRS has provided only limited guidance on 
whether or under what circumstances PV grants 
offered by state, local, or utility PV programs 
should be considered taxable versus non-taxable 
income.  Section 61 of the Internal Revenue 
Code generally defines gross (taxable) income to 
mean income derived from any source, except as 
otherwise provided in statute.  Though this 
suggests that PV grants should generally be 
considered taxable income (unless statutorily 
excluded from taxation), the previous case study 
explored four possible grounds for exclusion 
from taxation.  Specifically, a PV grant would be 
considered non-taxable if it were found to be one 
of the following:  (1) a government social welfare 
payment; (2) a manufacturer or dealer rebate of 
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the purchase price; (3) a contribution to the 
capital of a corporation under Section 118 of the 
Internal Revenue Code; or (4) a utility energy 
conservation subsidy under Section 136 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which applies to 
residential systems only. 
 
Though it is difficult to generalize, given the 
highly factual nature of the law surrounding this 
issue, it appears that state, local, or utility grants 
made to commercial PV systems will, in most 
cases, likely not qualify for any of the four 
exclusions listed above, and will therefore be 
considered taxable grants that do not reduce the 
project’s basis to which the federal ITC and 
depreciation apply. 
 
The taxability of a grant made to a residential PV 
system, meanwhile, will depend on whether or 
not that grant is considered to be a “utility energy 
conservation subsidy,” which in turn depends on 
whether the grant program is structured or 
administered (either directly or indirectly) as a 
“utility program” under Section 136.  Despite 
several IRS private letter rulings of potential 
relevance, some uncertainty remains as to what 
exactly constitutes a “utility program.”3 
 
Moreover, the 2006 case study found that 
because of the $2,000 cap on the residential ITC 
(which will be binding for all but the smallest 
systems) and the absence of depreciation 
benefits, residential system owners were 
generally better off financially with a non-
                                                 
3
 It is clear that eligible subsidy payments provided under a 
utility-administered program will qualify for the Section 136 
exclusion.  There is somewhat less clarity on programs 
administered by governmental entities.  Although earlier 
IRS rulings suggested that a government-administered 
program would never be considered a utility program 
(regardless of the funding source), a 2007 private letter 
ruling concerning the Energy Trust of Oregon (the non-
profit administrator of Oregon’s ratepayer-funded PV 
program) suggests that the IRS will, at least in some cases, 
consider a utility-ratepayer-funded program that is not 
administered by a utility to nevertheless be a “utility 
program” that qualifies for the Section 136 exclusion.  
Hence, it follows that if a governmental administrator can 
make a strong case that it is administering a utility program 
(i.e., that it is passing through utility or ratepayer funding), it 
is possible that the IRS might find the program eligible for 
the Section 136 exclusion. 
taxable, rather than taxable, grant.4  That is, in 
most cases the tax savings from receiving a non-
taxable cash rebate (compared to a taxable one) 
came without negative consequence, because the 
$2,000 ITC cap remained binding even after the 
basis was reduced accordingly.  The opposite was 
(and still is) true for commercial systems, which 
are better off paying income tax on the grant, and 
then applying the uncapped 30% ITC and 
accelerated depreciation to the full project cost. 
 
Finally, this preference for non-taxable grants 
among residential PV owners raised potential 
implications for PV program administration.  
Specifically, with the $2,000 cap in place, it 
would be advantageous for most residential PV 
system owners to have PV incentive programs be 
structured in a way that would qualify as a 
“utility program” under Section 136, thereby 
enabling those programs to provide non-taxable 
grants to residential system owners. 
 
Implications of the Revised Residential 
Credit 
 
With the October 2008 changes to the residential 
ITC, some of the previous case study’s findings 
with respect to the Section 136 exclusion no 
longer hold.  Moreover, the changes raise several 
new potential implications for low-interest loan 
programs, state and local PV program incentive 
levels, and even third-party ownership models in 
the residential sector.  This section discusses each 
of these implications in turn. 
 
The Financial Implications of Section 136 Are 
Now Less Significant for PV System Owners 
and PV Program Administrators 
 
Whether or not a residential PV system owner is 
better off (on net) with a taxable or non-taxable 
state, local, or utility PV grant depends solely on 
how that system owner’s marginal income tax 
                                                 
4
 It is worth noting that the taxpayer is not at liberty to 
choose whether or not to pay tax on a PV rebate.  Instead, a 
rebate that qualifies for the Section 136 exclusion must be 
treated as non-taxable, while one that does not qualify must 
be treated as taxable.  It is also worth repeating (from the 
2006 case study) that tax implications cannot be avoided or 
optimized by assigning rebates to installers or third parties; 
the burden of taxation rests with the intended recipient. 
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rate compares to the effective (i.e., capped) ITC 
percentage.  If the system owner’s tax rate is 
below the effective ITC percentage, then it is 
more advantageous to pay tax on the grant and 
not reduce the ITC basis.  Conversely, if the 
system owner’s income tax rate is higher than the 
effective ITC percentage, then it is more 
advantageous to not pay tax on the grant and to 
reduce the ITC basis accordingly. 
 
Whenever the $2,000 ITC cap is binding – which 
it has been for all residential systems larger than 
roughly 1 kW – the effective ITC percentage falls 
below the stated 30%.  For a 2 kW system 
installed at a cost of $9.5/W and receiving a 
$3/W rebate, for example, the effective ITC 
percentage (under the $2,000 cap) is roughly 
either 10.5% or 15.5%, depending on whether or 
not the rebate is taxable.  For larger systems, the 
effective ITC percentage is even lower – e.g., just 
6% or 9% for a 4 kW system under the same 
parameters (but installed for $8.5/W).  Since 
most individual income tax rates are likely to be 
higher than these effective ITC rates (e.g., in 
2007, individual income tax brackets ranged 
from 10% to 35%), it has – as noted earlier – 
generally been more advantageous for a 
residential PV owner to receive a non-taxable 
rebate with the $2,000 cap in place (as also 
mentioned above, the opposite holds true for 
owners of commercial PV systems, because the 
30% commercial ITC has not been capped and 
because a non-taxable grant will reduce not only 
a commercial system’s tax credit basis, but also 
its depreciable basis). 
 
With the removal of the $2,000 cap, however, the 
effective ITC percentage will now always equal 
30%.  Since 30% is likely to be higher than most 
residential system owners’ tax brackets (e.g., in 
2007, the marginal income tax rate for married 
couples filing jointly only surpassed 30% –
stepping up from 28% to 33% – once taxable 
income exceeded $196,000), most residential PV 
system owners are likely to be somewhat better 
off receiving a taxable grant going forward. 
 
The magnitude of the net difference between a 
taxable and non-taxable rebate will vary 
depending on a number of factors.  In general, 
the difference will increase given a higher rebate, 
a larger PV system, and/or a greater disparity 
between the effective ITC percentage and the 
owner’s marginal income tax rate.  Because the 
$2,000 cap generally exacerbates this disparity 
by severely curtailing the effective ITC 
percentage, the magnitude of the difference is 
generally larger under the capped ITC than it will 
be going forward under the uncapped ITC. 
 
Figure 1.  Impact of Tax Treatment of Grants on Residential PV Economics 
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Figure 1 illustrates how the magnitude of the 
difference between a non-taxable and taxable 
grant (in combination with the ITC) varies across 
some of these parameters.  The two dashed lines, 
which correspond to an ITC capped at $2,000, 
show that (A) a non-taxable rebate is superior to 
a taxable rebate when the ITC is capped; (B) the 
impact is greater for system owners in a higher 
tax bracket; and (C) the impact increases along 
with the size of the incentive.   
 
Meanwhile, the two solid lines, which correspond 
to system owners in the 25% and 35% tax 
brackets receiving an uncapped ITC, are mirror 
images of one another, reflecting the fact that the 
two tax brackets equally straddle the effective 
ITC percentage of 30%.  For reasons explained 
above, the non-taxable incentive is superior 
under the 35% tax bracket, while the taxable 
incentive is superior under the 25% tax bracket 
(at a hypothetical 30% tax bracket, the taxpayer 
would be indifferent between a non-taxable or 
taxable grant).  Finally, comparing the two solid 
lines to the two dashed lines illustrates that the 
difference between a non-taxable and taxable 
incentive is significantly larger under a capped 
ITC. 
 
In summary, although in the past (under the 
$2,000 cap) it has been advantageous for PV 
program rebates to qualify for the Section 136 
exclusion from taxation, that advantage generally 
no longer holds under an uncapped ITC.  In fact, 
for many PV system owners (especially those in 
lower tax brackets; those in the two highest tax 
brackets will still find a non-taxable incentive to 
be most advantageous), a taxable incentive will 
be modestly more advantageous beginning on 
January 1, 2009.  At the same time, however, the 
net financial difference between a taxable and 
non-taxable rebate going forward will be much 
smaller than it was under the capped ITC.  As 
such, PV incentive program will likely have little 
motivation to try to persuade the IRS that they 
either fall within the Section 136 exclusion, or 
not, on a going forward basis.5 
                                                 
5
 One potential implication of this shift, however, involves 
the likely difference between capacity-based and 
performance-based incentives (CBIs and PBIs) with respect 
to Section 136.  Specifically, Section 136(a) states that 
“Gross income shall not include the value of any subsidy 
Subsidized Loan Programs May No Longer 
Make Sense for Many Residential PV Owners 
 
A number of state and local government agencies 
offer low-interest loan programs to help finance 
the installation of energy efficiency measures 
and/or renewable energy systems.  Due to its 
high up-front cost and widespread appeal, 
residential PV is frequently a target of such 
programs.  Although low-interest loan programs 
can ease the burden of purchasing a PV system, it 
should be recognized that if such programs are 
considered by the IRS to be “subsidized energy 
financing,” then the dollar value of the ITC must 
be reduced by the dollar amount financed in this 
manner. 
 
Specifically, Section 25D(e)(9) of the Internal 
Revenue Code states, with respect to the tax basis 
of the project, that “For purposes of determining 
the amount of expenditures made by any 
individual with respect to any dwelling unit, there 
shall not be taken into account expenditures 
which are made from subsidized energy 
financing (as defined in section 48 (a)(4)(C)).”  
In other words, the tax basis of the project to 
which the credit applies shall be reduced by the 
amount of any subsidized energy financing used 
to finance the system. 
                                                                          
provided (directly or indirectly) by a public utility to a 
customer for the purchase or installation of any energy 
conservation measure” [italics added].  Since PBIs do not 
directly assist with the purchase or installation of the PV 
system, but instead augment the revenue generated by the 
system, one might argue that PBIs do not fall under Section 
136, and therefore are considered taxable income.  A second 
reason that PBIs do not fit well under Section 136 is that if 
PBIs were found to be non-taxable under Section 136, it is 
unclear how system owners would go about reducing the tax 
basis of the system for the purpose of applying the ITC, 
given that the PBI is earned over time, with the exact dollar 
amount known only in retrospect. 
 
Assuming, for these reasons, that residential PBIs will 
always be taxable, a program administrator whose rebate 
program otherwise falls under Section 136 could potentially 
increase the net impact of its incentives for PV system 
owners in lower tax brackets by switching from grants or 
rebates to PBIs.  For the same reason, existing programs that 
allow residential participants to choose either a CBI or a PBI 
(e.g., the California Solar Initiative) may see greater interest 
in the PBI option starting in 2009, at least among those 
participants in lower tax brackets.  Of course, these possible 
tax advantages to PBIs may be offset by other, unrelated 
disadvantages to PBIs in the residential sector.  
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Section 48(a)(4)(C), meanwhile, defines the term 
"subsidized energy financing" to mean 
"…financing provided under a Federal, State, or 
local program a principal purpose of which is to 
provide subsidized financing for projects 
designed to conserve or produce energy."  The 
instructions to IRS Form 6497 ("Information 
Return of Nontaxable Energy Grants or 
Subsidized Energy Financing") expand upon the 
Section 48 definition, noting that "Financing is 
subsidized if the terms of the financing provided 
to the recipient in connection with the program or 
used to raise funds for the program are more 
favorable than terms generally available 
commercially."  Moreover, "The source of the 
funds for a program is not a factor in determining 
whether the financing is subsidized."  
 
A number of existing loan programs clearly fall 
into the category of subsidized energy financing.  
In New York, for example, the Energy Smart 
Loan Program adds value by reducing the interest 
rate offered by commercial lenders by up to 4% 
(e.g., a 7% bank loan would cost the borrower as 
little as 3%).  The resulting interest rate is clearly 
“more favorable than terms generally available 
commercially,” and the IRS would therefore 
presumably categorize this program as offering 
subsidized energy financing. 
 
Other cases are less clear-cut.  For example, a 
number of municipalities throughout the U.S. are 
currently implementing innovative financing 
programs that combine attractive loan terms with 
repayment through higher property tax 
assessments.  Most strongly identified with the 
City of Berkeley, California, which first proposed 
the idea, this type of program may or may not 
constitute subsidized energy financing.6  More 
generally, the IRS has not yet offered definitive 
guidance on what constitutes subsidized energy 
financing in these and other cases. 
 
With the residential ITC capped at just $2,000, 
the loss of the ITC due to the use of subsidized 
energy financing has – up to this point – not 
                                                 
6
 For more information on this issue as it relates to 
Berkeley’s program, see “Property Tax Assessments as a 
Finance Vehicle for Residential PV Installations: 
Opportunities and Potential Limitations”, available at:  
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMP/cases/property-tax-finance.pdf 
necessarily been a losing proposition.  Depending 
on the specifics of the program, attractive 
financing terms may actually outweigh the loss 
of the ITC.  This is particularly true for larger 
residential PV systems, where the capped ITC 
represents a smaller proportion of the overall 
costs that need to be financed.  And, of course, 
such financing programs may offer other benefits 
to consumers as well. 
 
Now that the cap has been lifted, however, much 
more economic value is at stake.  Picking up on 
our previous example, a 4 kW system installed at 
$8.5/W and receiving a $3/W rebate will now be 
eligible for an ITC of either $10,200 or $6,600, 
depending on whether or not the rebate is 
taxable.  The loss of this amount of tax credit 
value (or some fraction thereof, if only a portion 
or the system is financed through such a 
program) will obviously impinge upon system 
economics much more so than the loss of just 
$2,000, and will likely make even the most-
aggressive low-interest loan programs 
uneconomical.  Such programs, however, may 
continue to fill an important need for those 
residents who are unable to make efficient use of 
the uncapped ITC (e.g., by having to 
continuously roll it forward for a number of years 
before fully absorbing it). 
 
In an uncapped ITC environment, and under 
current law, the value of PV financing programs 
could potentially be optimized by providing 
favorable terms other than reduced interest rates.  
For example, a market-rate loan program that 
features a no-hassle application and approval 
process, no collateral requirements, no closing 
fees, and extended maturities, might still provide 
value, but might not be considered subsidized 
energy financing.  Some of the municipal 
property-tax-based PV programs that are 
emerging may fit this bill, for example, by 
offering an innovative and extended loan 
repayment method (i.e., tied to property taxes) 
that is nevertheless financed at market rates.  
Alternatively, if a utility could be persuaded to 
offer a low-interest PV loan program, this might 
not be considered subsidized energy financing, if 
the program was not considered by the IRS to be 
“a Federal, State, or local program.”  Informed 
legal counsel should be consulted to determine 
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whether such approaches might work, however, 
because the IRS has not offered definitive 
guidance on whether any of the program ideas 
noted here would or would not be considered 
subsidized energy financing; IRS rulings will 
likely be required to reach definitive conclusions. 
 
In the meantime, one thing is clear:  it is now 
more important that ever to understand whether 
or not a loan program is at risk of being 
considered “subsidized energy financing,” and to 
take steps to minimize the potential for such a 
characterization. 
 
State, Local, and Utility PV Programs Can 
Potentially Reduce Residential Incentive Levels 
Without Negatively Impacting the Market 
 
With the exception of the smallest systems, 
which have not been impacted by the $2,000 cap 
on the residential ITC, most residential PV 
systems installed starting in 2009 will realize 
significant additional value from the elimination 
of the ITC cap.  State, local, and utility PV 
program administrators may, in turn, wish to 
capture at least some of this incremental value by 
reducing their incentive levels. 
 
Assuming that current residential rebates are set 
at a level that provides the desired amount of 
support to the residential sector (i.e., assuming no 
adjustments to rebate levels need to be made 
apart from those related to the removal of the 
ITC cap), Figures 2 and 3 show the maximum 
amount by which these rebate levels could – in 
theory – be reduced (starting in 2009, once the 
ITC cap is gone) without leaving system owners 
any worse off on an after-tax basis than they are 
now under current rebate levels and the $2,000 
ITC cap.  Figure 2 shows this amount for non-
taxable rebates, while Figure 3 provides the same 
information for taxable rebates. 
 
For non-taxable rebates (Figure 2), the magnitude 
of the potential rebate reduction depends only on 
the size and cost of the system,7 as well as the 
starting (or “current”) rebate level; the system 
owner’s income tax bracket does not factor in to 
                                                 
7
 Both Figures 2 and 3 assume that per-unit installed costs 
decline along a concave curve from $10.50/W at 0.5 kW to 
$7.75/W at 10 kW. 
the calculation, because the rebates are non-
taxable.  As shown, small systems (0.5 kW-2 
kW) cannot withstand as much of a rebate 
reduction as can larger systems, because smaller 
systems will benefit less from the removal of the 
$2,000 cap (i.e., they were not as impacted by the 
cap in the first place).  Above roughly 3 kW, 
however, the curves more or less level out, 
revealing that a rebate currently set at $1/W 
could be reduced by as much as $2.5/W (in 
theory, going negative8) without leaving the 
system owner any worse off on an after-tax basis.  
Meanwhile, starting with a non-taxable rebate of 
$4/W, the size of the potential reduction is 
smaller, at roughly $1.25/W (starting rebate 
levels of $2/W and $3/W fall in between these 
two extremes).  This rank-ordering makes 
intuitive sense:  a small non-taxable rebate 
reduces the ITC’s basis by less than does a large 
one, which means that the removal of the $2,000 
ITC cap provides greater benefit to a system 
receiving a smaller non-taxable rebate.  Such a 
system can, in theory, therefore withstand a 
larger reduction in the size of the rebate. 
 
For taxable rebates (Figure 3), the size of the 
potential rebate reduction depends only on the 
size and cost of the system, as well as the system 
owner’s federal income tax bracket; the starting 
rebate level does not factor in to the calculation, 
because taxable rebates do not reduce the ITC’s 
basis.  As shown, the curves look similar to those 
in Figure 2, rising rapidly up to about 3 kW, after 
which they level out.  At that point, taxable 
rebates could be reduced anywhere from $2.3/W 
to $3.2/W, depending on the owner’s federal tax 
bracket (all six tax brackets that existed in 2007 
are shown in Figure 3).  System owners in higher 
tax brackets can withstand a larger rebate 
reduction than those in lower brackets, because 
the formers’ tax burden is reduced relatively 
more as the rebate level drops (i.e., the benefit of 
paying less income tax on a $2/W rebate than on 
a $4/W rebate is greater for those in higher tax 
brackets; hence they can withstand a larger rebate 
reduction). 
 
                                                 
8
 Although a negative rebate is obviously not a practical 
outcome (i.e., rebates would never fall below $0), we 
express the results of the analysis in this way to demonstrate 
the relative magnitudes at stake. 
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Figure 2.  The Maximum Amount By Which A Non-Taxable Rebate Can Be Reduced In Response To 
The Removal Of The $2,000 Cap On The Residential ITC 
 
Figure 3.  The Maximum Amount By Which A Taxable Rebate Can Be Reduced In Response To The 
Removal Of The $2,000 Cap On The Residential ITC 
 
 
In response to the lifting of the residential ITC 
cap, several state, local, and utility PV programs 
have reduced the level of the incentives that they 
will provide to residential PV systems.  A 
number of other programs are considering doing 
the same. 
 
The Connecticut Clean Energy Fund, for 
example, has reduced its residential PV incentive 
from $5/W to $4/W (a $1/W reduction) for the 
first 5 kW installed, and from $4.30/W to 
$2.50/W (a $1.80/W reduction) for the next 5 
kW.  The larger reduction for the sixth through 
tenth kW reflects the fact that the abolishment of 
the cap benefits larger systems more than smaller 
systems, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
In Colorado, the investor-owned utility Xcel 
Energy has reduced (only for systems less than 
10 kW) the up-front, lump-sum amount that it 
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by Xcel remains unchanged, for a total up-front 
incentive of $3.50/W.9 
 
The California Energy Commission has decided 
to leave incentives for the New Solar Homes 
Partnership unchanged in an effort to boost the 
appeal of PV and also mitigate some of the 
negative impact of the distressed housing market.  
Meanwhile, the California Public Utilities 
Commission, which administers the other 
California Solar Initiative programs, is accepting 
public comment on whether to change its 
incentives in response to the ITC changes; initial 
comments are due November 20, with reply 
comments due on December 4. 
 
The New Jersey Board of Public Utilities is also 
accepting public comment on what changes, if 
any, should be made to New Jersey’s incentive 
levels.  Comments are due on November 21, and 
staff expect to make a recommendation to the 
Board on December 8. 
 
While the idea of shifting part of the cost of 
supporting residential PV to the federal 
government must look quite appealing to many 
PV program managers (e.g., allowing them to 
stretch fixed budgets to support additional 
installations), there are, nevertheless, several 
factors that program managers may wish to 
consider when deciding by how much to reduce 
residential incentive levels, and that may suggest 
that incentives should not be cut by as much as 
Figures 2 and 3 show may be possible.  These 
considerations include the following: 
• PV system owners may have to wait up to 
a year or more (depending on how early in 
the year the system is installed) before they 
file their tax returns and realize the benefit 
of the ITC.  During this waiting period, the 
accrued dollar benefit of the ITC must 
effectively be financed by some other 
means, which renders the ITC less-useful 
than an equivalent up-front cash incentive. 
                                                 
9
 Interestingly, if Xcel’s rebate falls under the Section 136 
exclusion from taxation while its up-front SREC payment 
does not (since the latter is a payment in exchange for 
SRECs, rather than a “subsidy”), then the negative impact of 
a $1/W reduction on most prospective residential PV system 
owners would have been less severe if the cut had been 
made to the rebate rather than to the up-front REC purchase. 
• With the $2,000 cap removed, the 
uncapped ITC may be too large for some 
taxpayers to absorb in the first year, or 
perhaps ever (in the most extreme cases).  
For example, a 4 kW system costing 
$8.5/W will, starting in 2009, be eligible 
for an ITC of $10,200 (assuming no 
subsidized energy financing or non-taxable 
incentives).  The taxpayer owning this 
system must have an income tax liability of 
at least $10,200 in the year the system is 
installed in order to make efficient use of 
the credit.  Although any unused portion of 
the credit can be rolled forward for 20 
years, doing so reduces the value of the 
credit in current dollars. 
• In recent years, the PV market in the U.S. 
has been increasingly dominated by the 
commercial sector, which has not only 
been more-heavily subsidized by federal 
tax policy, but also somewhat surprisingly 
by some PV programs as well.10  
Maintaining the status quo on residential 
incentives, or reducing them by less than is 
possible, may help to restore more of a 
balance between the residential and 
commercial markets. 
• Somewhat related, Figures 2 and 3 
presume that current or starting rebate 
levels are set at the “correct” or “optimal” 
level to provide the desired amount of 
support to the residential sector.  If this is 
not the case – e.g., if current residential 
incentive levels are too low to adequately 
stimulate desired market demand – then the 
results shown in Figures 2 and 3 may be 
too aggressive. 
• Finally, leaving residential incentives 
unchanged should accelerate the adoption 
of residential PV at no extra per-system 
cost to the program.  This motivation, 
however, must be weighed against the 
foregone benefit of any additional 
installations that could be supported by 
reducing incentive levels and thereby 
stretching fixed program budgets. 
 
                                                 
10
 Ryan Wiser, Galen Barbose, Carla Peterman. 2008. “An 
Empirical Investigation of PV Cost Trends, and Implications 
for Incentive Program Design.” Presentation at Solar Power 
International, San Diego, California, October 15, 2008. 
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Third-Party Ownership Structures Now Hold 
Somewhat Less Economic Appeal In The 
Residential Sector 
 
For several years now, the non-residential sector 
has benefited from third-party PV financing 
structures, including leasing and power purchase 
agreements (PPAs), that enable site hosts to “go 
solar” without the associated up-front costs and, 
in some cases, risks of ownership.11  By engaging 
“tax equity” investors with an appetite for tax 
credits, these structures also enable the efficient 
use of the substantial tax benefits (consisting of 
the ITC and accelerated depreciation) provided to 
a commercial PV project.  These tax benefits, 
which on a present value basis equal roughly 
56% of the installed cost of a commercial PV 
system,12 are often too large for a commercial site 
host to efficiently absorb on its own, and are 
completely unavailable to tax-exempt site hosts.  
Through third-party ownership, the value of these 
tax benefits can be monetized and passed through 
to the site host in the form of lower lease or PPA 
payments. 
 
One would think that, other potential benefits 
aside, the ability to monetize and pass along the 
higher tax benefits available to commercial 
owners would make the residential sector a 
particularly attractive market for third-party 
ownership.  Yet, due to a combination of 
heightened credit concerns, larger proportional 
transaction costs, and a simple need to first gain 
comfort with the structures in a commercial 
setting, third-party ownership has been somewhat 
                                                 
11
 For more information on third-party ownership structures, 
see LBNL’s “Financing Non-Residential Photovoltaic 
Projects:  Options and Implications”, soon to be available at 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMP/re-pubs.html 
12
 Specifically, 30% comes from the ITC and another 26% 
from 5-year accelerated depreciation.  It is worth noting, 
however, that relative to a 20-year straight-line depreciation 
schedule that might otherwise be used if solar did not 
qualify for the accelerated 5-year schedule, the present value 
benefit of accelerated depreciation comes to just 12% (rather 
than 26%) of installed costs.  In other words, since all 
commercial assets are depreciated in one way or another, the 
26% absolute number overstates the incremental incentive 
provided by an accelerated schedule.  Compared to 
residential systems, however, which cannot be depreciated 
at all for tax purposes, the 26% absolute number is the 
correct point of comparison. 
slower in coming to the residential sector than to 
the commercial sector. 
 
Within the past year, however, several PV 
installers have begun to offer third-party leases 
and PPAs to the residential sector.  In addition, 
one publicly sponsored residential leasing 
program – the Connecticut Solar Lease program 
– has been launched. 
 
With the removal of the $2,000 ITC cap, at least 
one of the tax advantages of these third-party 
ownership programs for the residential sector has 
been diminished.  With the $2,000 cap in place, 
the residential ITC’s value equals roughly 10% 
of the installed cost of a 2 kW system, and even 
less for larger systems.  This compares quite 
poorly with the 56% figure (which includes both 
the ITC and accelerated depreciation – residential 
systems cannot be depreciated for tax purposes) 
presented above for commercial systems, and 
highlights the significant arbitrage opportunity 
presented by commercial third-party ownership 
in the residential sector.  With the $2,000 
residential ITC cap eliminated starting in 2009, 
however, the comparison going forward will still 
favor commercial systems (due to accelerated 
depreciation), but by a smaller margin:  56% for 
commercial systems versus 30% for residential. 
 
The removal of the $2,000 ITC cap does not, 
however, sound the death knell of third-party 
ownership in the residential sector.  Indeed, 
though greatly diminished, a sizable arbitrage 
opportunity (equal to 26% of installed costs) still 
exists.  Furthermore, as discussed earlier, with 
“subsidized” financing programs no longer 
making much sense for PV, and with state and 
local PV programs reducing their residential 
incentive levels in response to the ITC revisions, 
there are likely to be fewer financing options 
available to cash-strapped prospective PV 
owners, potentially creating a greater need for 
third-party ownership.  Finally, third-party 
ownership provides other potentially attractive 
benefits besides tax credit monetization (e.g., no 
performance risk); these benefits may ultimately 
trump more-traditional financial considerations. 
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Conclusions 
 
Although policy support for emerging 
technologies generally seeks to reward early 
adopters, in the case of the Section 25D 
residential ITC, procrastinators have been the 
beneficiaries – initially in 2006 when the capped 
ITC was first implemented, and again in October 
2008 when the $2,000 cap was eventually lifted.  
Though welcomed by the industry and 
prospective PV owners, these changes in federal 
tax policy have necessitated reactive planning at 
the state and local levels.   
 
This case study has highlighted a number of ways 
in which state, local, and utility PV program 
administrators must remain nimble in responding 
to the recent changes in federal solar policy: 
• Most obviously, program managers may 
wish to reduce their incentive levels to at 
least partially compensate for the more-
valuable ITC. 
• Complementary low-interest loan programs 
that can be characterized as “subsidized 
energy financing” may no longer make 
sense for residential PV, and should 
potentially be re-tooled (to focus on 
providing “unsubsidized” support) or re-
directed at other clean technologies for 
which subsidized energy financing is not as 
large of an issue. 
• At the same time, third-party financing and 
ownership models that have recently begun 
to make inroads into the residential sector 
may now face a somewhat harder sell.  
Thus, there may be a continuing need for 
policies that address financial barriers and 
support innovative financing models. 
• Finally, any previous motivation for PV 
program administrators to structure their 
programs as a “utility program” under 
Section 136 (in order to offer non-taxable 
incentives) has now been largely removed, 
or even reversed. 
 
A critical prerequisite to knowing how to react to 
some of these changes is a solid understanding of 
whether or not a program’s incentives are 
currently treated as taxable income.  For 
example, an incentive level reduction that seems 
reasonable given a taxable incentive may be too 
severe if the incentive is, in fact, non-taxable.  
Likewise, attempting to optimize incentive value 
through program structure (i.e., whether the 
program is defined as a “utility program” under 
Section 136) requires knowing where a program 
currently stands from a tax standpoint.  Finally, 
one must also take this taxable/non-taxable 
distinction into account when running the 
numbers to evaluate whether or under what 
circumstances subsidized energy financing 
programs still make sense on net (of course, one 
also needs to know whether the program in 
question does, in fact, constitute “subsidized 
energy financing”). 
 
For these reasons, PV program administrators 
that do not yet know whether or not their 
incentives are taxable are encouraged to seek 
qualified legal counsel, or even IRS guidance, to 
put this question to rest once and for all.  
Similarly, programs that offer low-interest loans 
are encouraged to seek guidance from the IRS on 
whether or not those loan programs are 
considered to be “subsidized energy financing.” 
 
The eight-year extension of the ITC provides a 
long-term and relatively stable federal policy 
environment for PV.  By making informed 
programmatic changes in response to the new 
federal solar policy landscape, PV program 
administrators can capitalize on and contribute to 
this unprecedented stability. 
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A number of U.S. states have established clean energy funds to support renewable and clean forms of electricity 
production. This represents a new trend towards aggressive state support for clean energy, but few efforts have 
been made to report and share the early experiences of these funds.   
 
This paper is part of a series of clean energy fund case studies prepared by Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory and the Clean Energy States Alliance.  The primary purpose of this case study series is to report on 
the innovative programs and administrative practices of state (and some international) clean energy funds, to 
highlight additional sources of information, and to identify contacts.  Our hope is that these case studies will be 
useful for clean energy funds and other stakeholders that are interested in learning about the pioneering 
renewable energy efforts of clean energy funds.  To access or download all the case studies, see:  
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/cases/ or http://www.cleanenergystates.org/ 
 
ABOUT THE CLEAN ENERGY STATES ALLIANCE 
 
The Clean Energy States Alliance (CESA) is a non-profit initiative funded by members and foundations to 
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original research, and helps to coordinate activities of the state funds. The main purpose of CESA is to help 
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